singe/thirdparty/openssl/wycheproof/javascript/webcryptoapi/testcases/RsaOaedTest.js
2023-11-16 22:15:24 -06:00

106 lines
4.4 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* @license
* Copyright 2017 Google Inc. All rights reserved.
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
/**
* Tests for RSA-OAEP encryption implementations of Web Crypto API.
*/
goog.provide('wycheproof.webcryptoapi.RSA-OAED');
goog.require('e2e.random');
goog.require('goog.testing.asserts');
goog.require('goog.testing.jsunit');
goog.require('wycheproof.TestUtil');
goog.require('wycheproof.webcryptoapi.RsaUtil');
var RsaUtil = wycheproof.webcryptoapi.RsaUtil;
var TestUtil = wycheproof.TestUtil;
/**
* Tries decrypting random messages with a given algorithm. Counts the number of distinct error
* messages and expects this number to be 1.
*
* <p><b>References:</b>
*
* <ul>
* <li>Bleichenbacher, "Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the RSA encryption
* standard PKCS# 1" Crypto 98
* <li>Manger, "A chosen ciphertext attack on RSA optimal asymmetric encryption padding (OAEP)
* as standardized in PKCS# 1 v2.0", Crypto 2001 This paper shows that OAEP is susceptible
* to a chosen ciphertext attack if error messages distinguish between different failure
* condidtions.
* <li>Bardou, Focardi, Kawamoto, Simionato, Steel, Tsay "Efficient Padding Oracle Attacks on
* Cryptographic Hardware", Crypto 2012 The paper shows that small differences on what
* information an attacker recieves can make a big difference on the number of chosen
* message necessary for an attack.
* <li>Smart, "Errors matter: Breaking RSA-based PIN encryption with thirty ciphertext validity
* queries" RSA conference, 2010 This paper shows that padding oracle attacks can be
* successful with even a small number of queries.
* </ul>
*
* <p><b>Some recent bugs:</b> CVE-2012-5081: Java JSSE provider leaked information through
* exceptions and timing. Both the PKCS #1 padding and the OAEP padding were broken:
* http://www-brs.ub.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/netahtml/HSS/Diss/MeyerChristopher/diss.pdf
*
* <p><b>What this test does not (yet) cover:</b>
*
* <ul>
* <li> A previous version of one of the provider leaked the block type. (when was this fixed?)
* <li> Some attacks require a large number of ciphertexts to be detected if random ciphertexts
* are used. Such problems require specifically crafted ciphertexts to run in a unit test.
* E.g. "Attacking RSA-based Sessions in SSL/TLS" by V. Klima, O. Pokorny, and T. Rosa:
* https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/
* <li> Timing leakages because of differences in parsing the padding (e.g. CVE-2015-7827) Such
* differences are too small to be reliably detectable in unit tests.
* </ul>
*
* @return {!Promise}
*/
function testRsaEncryptionException() {
var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject){
var scheme = RsaUtil.RSA_OAEP;
var keySize = 1024;
var e = RsaUtil.E_65537;
var hashAlg = 'SHA-256';
var usages = ['encrypt', 'decrypt'];
var ctLen = keySize/8;
var nTest = 1000;
var nDone = 0;
var exceptions = new Set();
RsaUtil.generateKey(scheme, keySize, e, hashAlg, usages).then(function(key) {
for (var i = 0; i < nTest; i++) {
var ct = new Uint8Array(e2e.random.getRandomBytes(ctLen)).buffer;
RsaUtil.decrypt(scheme, key.privateKey, ct).then(function(pt){
reject('RSA-OAEP decryption should not succeed on random bytes');
}).catch(function(err){
exceptions.add(err.name + ': ' + err.message);
nDone += 1;
if (nDone == nTest) {
if (exceptions.size > 1) {
var msg = 'Exceptions leak information about the padding for ' + scheme + '\n';
exceptions.forEach(function(e) {
msg += e;
});
reject(msg);
}
resolve();
}
});
}
}).catch(function(err){
reject('Failed to generate key: ' + err);
});
});
return promise;
}