// Crypto primitives for dev-deploy peer auth.
//
//   seal/open           — AES-256-GCM for at-rest encryption of peer secrets.
//                         The 32-byte KEK is derived once per process via
//                         HKDF-SHA256 from Saltcorn's session secret (resolved
//                         from the installation: env var, ~/.config/.saltcorn,
//                         or DB config -- see getSessionSecret).
//   sign/verify         — HMAC-SHA256 for signed peer-to-peer requests.
//   buildCanonical      — canonical string format every signed request agrees on.
//   randomSecret        — 32 random bytes (peer_secret) at pairing time.
//
// Rotating SALTCORN_SESSION_SECRET invalidates all peer pairings (the KEK
// changes, so existing ciphertexts no longer decrypt). Documented behavior.

const crypto = require("crypto");


const KEK_INFO       = "dev-deploy:peer-secrets:aes-gcm-key:v1";
const HMAC_ALGORITHM = "sha256";
const GCM_ALGORITHM  = "aes-256-gcm";
const IV_BYTES       = 12;
const TAG_BYTES      = 16;
const SECRET_BYTES   = 32;
const NONCE_BYTES    = 16;
const SKEW_TOLERANCE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;


let cachedKek        = null;
let cachedSecretHash = null;


// Resolve the session secret from the Saltcorn installation, mirroring the
// precedence Saltcorn itself uses in db/connect.ts (env var -> ~/.config/.saltcorn
// -> generated). Leaning on Saltcorn's own resolution rather than requiring
// SALTCORN_SESSION_SECRET in the plugin's process environment lets dev-deploy
// install cleanly on an instance configured purely through the config file.
const getSessionSecret = () => {
    // 1. Explicit environment override (also what Saltcorn checks first).
    const fromEnv = process.env.SALTCORN_SESSION_SECRET;
    if (fromEnv && fromEnv.length > 0) {
        return fromEnv;
    }
    // 2. Saltcorn's resolved connection object. session_secret here has already
    //    been merged from the env var and the .saltcorn config file (and is the
    //    exact value Saltcorn signs its own session cookies with), so this is the
    //    single source of truth whenever the db module is initialised.
    try {
        const db = require("@saltcorn/data/db");
        if (db.connectObj && db.connectObj.session_secret) {
            return db.connectObj.session_secret;
        }
    } catch (e) {
        // db module not loadable in this context; fall through
    }
    // 3. Read the Saltcorn config file (~/.config/.saltcorn) directly, in case
    //    the db module is not yet initialised when we are called.
    try {
        const { getConfigFile } = require("@saltcorn/data/db/connect");
        const cfg = getConfigFile();
        if (cfg && cfg.session_secret) {
            return cfg.session_secret;
        }
    } catch (e) {
        // connect module not available; fall through
    }
    // 4. DB-stored config value, if any.
    try {
        const { getState } = require("@saltcorn/data/db/state");
        const v = getState().getConfig("session_secret");
        if (v) {
            return v;
        }
    } catch (e) {
        // getState not available (e.g. outside a request context); fall through
    }
    throw new Error("dev-deploy: session_secret not available from environment, the Saltcorn config file, or DB config; cannot derive KEK");
};


const getKek = () => {
    // Re-derive if the session secret changes so a rotated secret never keeps
    // serving a stale KEK. session_secret is global, so this cache is shared
    // safely across tenants.
    const sessionSecret = getSessionSecret();
    const secretHash    = crypto.createHash(HMAC_ALGORITHM).update(sessionSecret, "utf8").digest("hex");
    if (cachedKek && cachedSecretHash === secretHash) {
        return cachedKek;
    }
    const salt = Buffer.from(KEK_INFO, "utf8");
    const ikm  = Buffer.from(sessionSecret, "utf8");
    cachedKek        = crypto.hkdfSync(HMAC_ALGORITHM, ikm, salt, Buffer.from(KEK_INFO, "utf8"), 32);
    cachedSecretHash = secretHash;
    return cachedKek;
};


const seal = (plaintext) => {
    const iv     = crypto.randomBytes(IV_BYTES);
    const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(GCM_ALGORITHM, getKek(), iv);
    const buf    = Buffer.isBuffer(plaintext) ? plaintext : Buffer.from(plaintext);
    const ct     = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(buf), cipher.final()]);
    const tag    = cipher.getAuthTag();
    return { ciphertext: ct, iv: iv, tag: tag };
};


const open = (sealed) => {
    const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(GCM_ALGORITHM, getKek(), sealed.iv);
    decipher.setAuthTag(sealed.tag);
    return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(sealed.ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
};


const randomSecret = () => {
    return crypto.randomBytes(SECRET_BYTES);
};


const randomNonce = () => {
    return crypto.randomBytes(NONCE_BYTES);
};


const sha256Hex = (data) => {
    const buf = Buffer.isBuffer(data) ? data : Buffer.from(data || "");
    return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(buf).digest("hex");
};


const buildCanonical = ({ timestamp, nonce, method, path, targetHost, body }) => {
    const bodyHash = sha256Hex(body || "");
    return [
        String(timestamp),
        String(nonce),
        String(method).toUpperCase(),
        String(path),
        String(targetHost || ""),
        bodyHash
    ].join("\n");
};


// Normalize a host[:port] so the signing side (outbound, derived from the peer
// base_url) and the verifying side (inbound, from the Host header) produce
// byte-identical canonicals: lowercase, trim, and drop the default port
// (clients omit :80/:443 from the Host header). Binding this into the canonical
// stops a request signed for one tenant being replayed against another tenant
// on the same multi-tenant server.
const normalizeHost = (h) => {
    return String(h || "").trim().toLowerCase().replace(/:(?:80|443)$/, "");
};


const sign = (secret, canonical) => {
    const mac = crypto.createHmac(HMAC_ALGORITHM, secret);
    mac.update(canonical, "utf8");
    return mac.digest("hex");
};


const verifySignature = (secret, canonical, providedHex) => {
    if (!providedHex || typeof providedHex !== "string") {
        return false;
    }
    let expectedBuf;
    let providedBuf;
    try {
        expectedBuf = Buffer.from(sign(secret, canonical), "hex");
        providedBuf = Buffer.from(providedHex, "hex");
    } catch (e) {
        return false;
    }
    if (expectedBuf.length !== providedBuf.length) {
        return false;
    }
    return crypto.timingSafeEqual(expectedBuf, providedBuf);
};


const timestampWithinSkew = (tsString) => {
    const ts  = Number(tsString);
    if (!Number.isFinite(ts)) {
        return false;
    }
    const now = Date.now();
    return Math.abs(now - ts) <= SKEW_TOLERANCE_MS;
};


module.exports = {
    seal,
    open,
    randomSecret,
    randomNonce,
    buildCanonical,
    normalizeHost,
    sign,
    verifySignature,
    timestampWithinSkew,
    sha256Hex,
    SKEW_TOLERANCE_MS
};